Versâo em português logo abaixo
As Iran's chief negotiator, Mohammad Javad Zarif, brought home a deal worth about US$23 billion to Iran, Arab Shiites
fell into step with Tehran. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki of Iraq
expressed his "full support for this step." President Bashar al-Assad of
Syria welcomed the agreement as "the best path for securing peace and
stability." Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri of Lebanon called it the "deal of the century." And Hezbollah considered the agreement a "great victory for Iran."
Among Sunni Arabic-speakers, in contrast, responses ranged from
politely supportive to displeased to alarmed. Perhaps most enthusiastic
was the Egyptian governmental newspaper Al-Ahram, which called the deal "historic." Most states stayed mum. Saudis expressed the most worry. Yes, the government cabinet
officially stated that "If there is goodwill, then this agreement could
be an initial step toward reaching a comprehensive solution to Iran's
nuclear program," but note the skepticism conveyed in the first four
words.
If that was the mildest response, perhaps the most unbuttoned comment came from Alwaleed bin Talal, a Saudi prince who occasionally sends up trial balloons for the royal family: He called Iran "a huge threat" and noted that, historically speaking, "The Persian empire was always against the Muslim Arab empire, especially against the Sunnis. The threat is from Persia, not from Israel," a ground-breaking and memorable public statement.
Alwaleed then detailed how the Iranians are "in Bahrain, they are in
Iraq, they are in Syria, they are with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas,
which is Sunni, in Gaza." As this listing suggests, Saudis are fixated
on the danger of being surrounded by Iran's agents and are more scared
by the non-nuclear implications of the joint plan than the nuclear ones.
Gregory Gause
of the University of Vermont sees Saudis worrying that the accord opens
the way "without any obstacles" for Iran to achieve regional dominance.
(This contrasts with the Israeli and Western position, which focuses on
the nuclear danger.)
Abdullah al-Askar, foreign affairs committee chairman of the kingdom's appointed Shura Council, elaborates: he worries "about giving Iran more space or a freer hand in the region. The government of Iran, month after month, has proven that it has an ugly agenda in the region, and in this regard no one in the region will sleep and assume things are going smoothly. … The people of the region … know that Iran will interfere in the politics of many countries."
Saudi media reiterated this line of analysis. Al-Watan, a government newspaper, warned that the Iran regime, "which sends its tentacles into other regional countries, or tries to do so by all means necessary," will not be fettered by the accord. Another daily, Al-Sharq, editorialized about the fear that "Iran made concessions in the nuclear dossier in return for more freedom of action in the region."
Some analysts, especially in the smaller Persian Gulf states, went further. Jaber Mohammad, a Bahraini analyst, predicted that "Iran and the West will now reach an accord on how to divide their influence in the Gulf." The Qatari government-owned Al-Quds Al-Arabi worried about "a U.S.-Iran alliance with Russian backing." Rumors of Obama wanting to visit Tehran only confirm these suspicions.
The Saudi ambassador in London, Prince Mohammed bin Nawaf bin Abdulaziz, drew the most overt public conclusion, threatening that "We are not going to sit idly by and receive a threat there and not think seriously how we can best defend our country and our region." To put it mildly, this is not how Saudi diplomats normally speak about fellow Muslims.
What does this unwonted rhetoric amount to? Iranian bellicosity and the Obama administration's pro-Iran policies have combined to end many decades of Saudi strategic reliance on Washington and to begin thinking how to protect themselves. This matters, because as Alwaleed rightly boasts, his country is leader of the Arabs, enjoying the most international, regional, cultural, and religious clout. The results of this new-found assertiveness – fighting against fellow Islamists, allying tacitly with Israel, perhaps acquiring Pakistani-made nuclear weapons, and even reaching out to Tehran – marks yet another consequence of Barack Obama's imploding foreign policy.
Versâo em Português
por Daniel Pipes
The Washington Times
3 de Dezembro de 2013
Saudis Bristle at Obama's Outreach to Iran
The "Joint Plan of Action" signed with Iran by the so-called P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the U.K., and the U.S.) on Nov. 24 in Geneva caused Shiite Arabs to celebrate, Sunni Arabs to worry, and Saudis to panic. The Saudi response will have far-reaching and unpredictable consequences.
Jubilant crowds welcomed the Iranian negotiator home from Geneva.
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Syria's Assad, here scratched out, praised the Geneva deal.
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If that was the mildest response, perhaps the most unbuttoned comment came from Alwaleed bin Talal, a Saudi prince who occasionally sends up trial balloons for the royal family: He called Iran "a huge threat" and noted that, historically speaking, "The Persian empire was always against the Muslim Arab empire, especially against the Sunnis. The threat is from Persia, not from Israel," a ground-breaking and memorable public statement.
Saudi prince Alwaleed bin Talal on his airplane throne, sitting under the logo of his company.
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Abdullah al-Askar, foreign affairs committee chairman of the kingdom's appointed Shura Council, elaborates: he worries "about giving Iran more space or a freer hand in the region. The government of Iran, month after month, has proven that it has an ugly agenda in the region, and in this regard no one in the region will sleep and assume things are going smoothly. … The people of the region … know that Iran will interfere in the politics of many countries."
Saudi media reiterated this line of analysis. Al-Watan, a government newspaper, warned that the Iran regime, "which sends its tentacles into other regional countries, or tries to do so by all means necessary," will not be fettered by the accord. Another daily, Al-Sharq, editorialized about the fear that "Iran made concessions in the nuclear dossier in return for more freedom of action in the region."
Some analysts, especially in the smaller Persian Gulf states, went further. Jaber Mohammad, a Bahraini analyst, predicted that "Iran and the West will now reach an accord on how to divide their influence in the Gulf." The Qatari government-owned Al-Quds Al-Arabi worried about "a U.S.-Iran alliance with Russian backing." Rumors of Obama wanting to visit Tehran only confirm these suspicions.
The Saudi ambassador in London, Prince Mohammed bin Nawaf bin Abdulaziz, drew the most overt public conclusion, threatening that "We are not going to sit idly by and receive a threat there and not think seriously how we can best defend our country and our region." To put it mildly, this is not how Saudi diplomats normally speak about fellow Muslims.
What does this unwonted rhetoric amount to? Iranian bellicosity and the Obama administration's pro-Iran policies have combined to end many decades of Saudi strategic reliance on Washington and to begin thinking how to protect themselves. This matters, because as Alwaleed rightly boasts, his country is leader of the Arabs, enjoying the most international, regional, cultural, and religious clout. The results of this new-found assertiveness – fighting against fellow Islamists, allying tacitly with Israel, perhaps acquiring Pakistani-made nuclear weapons, and even reaching out to Tehran – marks yet another consequence of Barack Obama's imploding foreign policy.
Mr. Pipes (DanielPipes.org) is president of the Middle East Forum. © 2013 by Daniel Pipes. All rights reserved.
Versâo em Português
por Daniel Pipes
The Washington Times
3 de Dezembro de 2013
Original em inglês: Saudis Bristle at Obama's Outreach to Iran
Tradução: Joseph Skilnik
Tradução: Joseph Skilnik
Multidão jubilosa dá boas-vindas ao negociador iraniano na chegada de Genebra.
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Assad da Síria, pichado no cartaz, elogiou o acordo de Genebra.
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Se esta foi a reação mais moderada, talvez o comentário mais desenfreado tenha sido do príncipe saudita Alwaleed bin Talal, que vez ou outra solta balões de ensaio para a família real: classificou o Irã de "enorme ameaça" salientando que, falando historicamente, "o império persa sempre foi contra o império muçulmano árabe, especialmente contra os sunitas. A ameaça vem da Pérsia, não de Israel", uma declaração pública pioneira e memorável.
Príncipe saudita Alwaleed bin Talal no trono de sua aeronave, sentado sob o logotipo de sua companhia.
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Abdullah al-Askar, nomeado para presidente da comissão de negócios estrangeiros do Conselho Shura, faz a seguinte análise: sua preocupação se refere ao "oferecimento de mais espaço ao Irã ou carta branca na região. Mês a mês o governo do Irã tem comprovado ter um projeto ameaçador na região, consequentemente ninguém na região irá dormir sossegado e acreditar que está tudo bem. Os povos da região sabem que o Irã irá interferir na política de diversos países".
A mídia saudita vem repetindo essa linha de pensamento. Al-Watan, um jornal estatal, alertou que o regime do Irã, "que penetra outros países da região com seus tentáculos ou tenta penetrar a qualquer custo", não se intimidará pelo acordo. Outro diário, Al-Sharq, expressa em um editorial o temor que o "Irã teria feito concessões no dossiê nuclear em troca de maior liberdade de ação na região".
Alguns analistas, especialmente nos países de menor extensão do Golfo Pérsico, foram ainda mais longe. Jaber Mohammad, analista bareinita, previu que o "Irã e o Ocidente chegarão agora a um acordo sobre a divisão da influência no Golfo". O Al-Quds Al-Arabi de propriedade do governo do Catar teme "a aliança dos EUA com o Irã, com o apoio russo". A circulação de boatos sobre o desejo de Obama de visitar Teerã, só faz confirmar as suspeitas.
O embaixador saudita em Londres, Príncipe Mohammed bin Nawaf bin Abdulaziz, tirou a conclusão pública mais evidente, ameaçando, "não assistiremos passivamente, nem seremos ameaçados sem cogitar seriamente a melhor maneira de defender nosso país e nossa região". Colocando a coisa de maneira educada, normalmente não é assim que os diplomatas sauditas se referem aos seus colegas muçulmanos.
Como interpretar toda essa estranha retórica? A belicosidade iraniana e a política pró-iraniana da administração Obama juntas acabaram com muitas décadas de dependência estratégica saudita de Washington e fizeram com que eles começassem a pensar em como se defender. Isso é muito importante, visto que Alwaleed se vangloria corretamente, que seu país é o líder dos árabes, desfrutando da maior parte do respaldo internacional, regional, cultural e religioso. O resultado dessa convicção recém descoberta, lutar contra irmãos islamistas, aliar-se tacitamente com Israel, adquirir talvez armas nucleares paquistanesas e quem sabe até se aproximar de Teerã, marca outra consequência da implosão da política externa de Barack Obama.
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